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WANDERING ON THE ROAD TO MECCA
Donald L Bakert
Today's governments serve ever more visibly as price reg-
ulators, cartel managers, and economic bullies. In fact, they are
doing what governments have generally done over the centuries-
promoting mercantilism and monopoly. Today, however, govern-
ments are acting on a more open and larger scale. Thus, the "oil
cartel"--made up of producer-country governments-quadrupled
the price of crude oil in a short time and-became a household word
around the world.' Nations that produce other primary products
seek to follow its lead with their own cartels, while consumer nations
talk about "counter-cartels" and other counter measures. The
government-organized Arab boycott of pro-Israeli businesses has
become a rising source of frustration in Western nations during the
past two years. Even the United States government has done a little
quiet cartelizing of its own: most notably, the Nixon administration's
efforts to obtain so-called "voluntary import quotas" from foreign
producers of steel. 2 It has also helped to create artificial shortages,
with artificial monopoly power, by various schemes of price regula-
tion.
3
This world of "cartels," "boycotts," and "monopoly" sounds very
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1957, Princeton; B.A. in Law 1959,
Cambridge University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard University.
This Article was prepared prior to the author's nomination to be Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Justice. The views stated here are
strictly those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of
Justice.
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960 by
five major petroleum states. The present member states of OPEC, and the year in which each
joined are: Algeria (1969), Ecuador (1973), Gabon (Associate Member, 1973), Indonesia
(1962), Iran (1960--Founding Member), Iraq (1960-Founding Member), Kuwait (1960--
Founding Member), Libyan Arab Republic (1962), Nigeria (1971), Qatar (1961), Saudi Arabia
(1960-Founding Member), United Arab Emirates (1967), and Venezuela (1960-Founding
Member). THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOKS OF FACTS 1976, at 675; "Brief," note 6 infra.
For a general discussion of the legal and economic position of the oil industry in the
Middle East, see G. LENCZOWSKI, MIDDLE EAST OIL IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (National
Energy Project 1976).
2 See Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), affd in part sub noma.
Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1 See, e.g., Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970); Emergency
Petroleum Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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much at odds with what antitrust law seeks to achieve-a world of
consumer choice and entreprenurial initiative. Antitrust law in the-
ory punishes the instigators of cartels, boycotts, and market alloca-
tion as per se violations, 4 and protects businessmen against "strong
arm" tactics by others in the market.5
Press coverage and public frustration with these governmental
"cartels" have generated demands for "antitrust" solutions to what
are essentially "political" problems.6 In fact, there are no exciting
new antitrust remedies against governments for their sovereign
conduct, however reprehensible that conduct may seem to those
dedicated to free markets. 7 Direct remedies against these new re-
straints of trade must come through politics and diplomacy.
The antitrust concern is with corporations that participate in, or
take special advantage of, government-imposed restraints and
government-created opportunities to restrain. Corporations, unlike
governments, can be reached by the antitrust laws. Indeed, the
greatest antitrust risks occur when corporations forget that they are
corporations and pretend that they are governments. "Playing gov-
ernment" may be heady, but it can also be dangerous. In essence, the
antitrust laws are used routinely to punish corporations for doing
what governments routinely do. "Restraints of princes" have long
4 In Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court noted:
[T]here are certain agreements of practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use .... Among the practices which
the courts have heretofore deemed to be unlawful in and among themselves are price
fixing... division of markets ... group boycotts .. and tying arrangements.
Id at 5 (citations omitted).
' See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), where the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argument that the market must be hurt by a boycott,
and not just the plaintiff:
Alleged in this complaint is a wide combination consisting of manufacturers,
distributors and a retailer. This combination takes from [the plaintiff retailer) its
freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and drives it out of
business as a dealer in the defendant's products .... As such it is not to be tolerated
merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his
destruction makes little difference to the economy. Monopoly can as surely thrive by
the elimination of such small businessmen, one at a time, as it can by driving them out
in large groups.
Id. at 212-13 (footnotes omitted).
6 See, e.g., so-called "Brief' for Gulf & Western Industries to the Attorney General on
OPEC's Status under United States Antitrust Law (also called the "Bludhorn Brief"), pro-
duced in 1975 by the New York law firms of Simpson, Thatcher & Bartlett, and Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, apparently for Gulf and Western Industries, on file at the
Cornell Law Review.
' Compare Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), with Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
Ass'n, 421 U.S. 778 (1975). See notes 38-45 and accompanying text infra.
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been expressly recognized in commercial law,8 while "restraints of
trade" have long been punished as antitrust violations.'
The corporation caught in the middle faces some novel anti-
trust risks. It can be prosecuted if it too willingly goes along with a
government-inspired cartel or boycott, if it relies on government
acquiescence or approval of basic restraints, or if it uses gov-
ernment-delegated power or government-created shortages to ex-
clude competition. In short, governments, so frequently bent on
restraining competition to serve political ends, are a fertile source of
new antitrust problems for the private sector.
In analyzing these problems, we should be pragmatic rather
than mechanical. As Judge Wyzanski so wisely stressed: "[I]n connec-
tion with the Sherman Act, it is delusive to treat opinions written by
different judges at different times as pieces of ajig-saw puzzle which
can be, by effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern."'10 The anti-
trust statutes speak in general terms. Their language does not man-
date answers to the close questions. Rather, the antitrust statutes
embody a broad commitment to competition as the fundamental
economic regulator, but leave room for shifts in the nature of the
commitment over time. Chief Justice Hughes made this point in
deciding Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, I" a case that was first
a shift,'2 and then an aberration, 3 in antitrust enforcement: "As a
charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a generality and an
adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitu-
tional provisions."'
4
8 See, e.g., Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 378,402 (1838). The "restraints
of princes" concept has been more recently embodied in statutory law in the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act § 4(2)(g), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(g) (1970). See Lekas & Drivas, Inc. v.
Goulandris, 306 F.2d 426,430 (2d Cir. 1962). The thrust of the rule is, of course, to excuse the
private party from performance of his duty (rather than punish the prince for interfering with
it!).
See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). See generally Letwin, The English Common Law
Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954).
10 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), affd
per curiam 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
1 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
12 It in effect cut back on the force of the strong rule announced in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), that "uniform price-fixing by those controlling in
any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by the
Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the particular prices agreed upon." Id. at 398.
" Its effective force was in turn limited in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940), which revived Trenton Potteries and laid down a strong per se rule against price
fixing which has generally been followed ever since. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp.
393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
14 288 U.S. at 359-60.
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Current shifts are clearly visible. The more conservative justices
of the Supreme Court's "new antitrust majority"'15 are putting a
brake ofn the proliferation of antitrust remedies by insisting on
tougher factual standards of proof.'6 At the same time, they are
often using lower standards for determining implied exemptions
from antitrust prohibitions.' 7 Meanwhile, in the Houses of Con-
gress, the shift is in the opposite direction. Political leaders who were
uninterested in antitrust law a decade ago are now vying with each
other to propose bigger antitrust penalties and sanctions, and
stronger antitrust enforcement.'
8
Antitrust law provides a basic series of public and private reme-
dies against private restraints of trade and business monopolies.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act'" makes price fixing, group boycotts,
divisions of markets, and tying arrangements per se illegal, 20 and it
punishes other restraints that have an unreasonable effect on com-
petition.2 ' Section 2 of the Act punishes conspiracies to monopolize
and successful monopolization. 22 Section 5 of the Federal Trade
's In Justice White's dissenting opinion in United States v. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S.
602, 642 (1974), he referred to Justice Stewart, and the four justices appointed by President
Nixon (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J.) as the new "antitrust majority."
16 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
17 See United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Gordon
v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975). But see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (showing shift the other way in labor exemption
area); and Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976) (discussed at text accompanying
notes 54-59 infra).
18 See, e.g., Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified in
scattered sections of 15, 32, 47, 49 U.S.C.) (stiffened penalties for violations of Sherman
Act); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (Supp. IV, 1974) (strengthened FTC investigation powers); Consumer Goods Pricing Act
of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)(2)-(b) (Supp. IV, 1974) (repealed federal
authorization for "fair trade" (resale price maintenance)).
Presently, numerous bills aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the antitrust laws are
being considered in both the House and Senate. The Scott-Hart bill, S. 1284, 94th Cong. 1st
Sess. (1975), passed by the Senate onJune 10, 1976 as H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975),
would (1) allow state attorneys general to sue for antitrust violations for treble damages on
behalf of injured citizens; (2) broaden the Justice Department's pre-complaint discovery; and
(3) enable the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission to obtain notice and limited
stay of a merger. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 68, E-1 (June 15, 1976). Also see S.
2845 (H.R. 11380), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), which makes provision for antitrust review of
proposed energy research contracts given by the Energy Research and Development Adminis-
tration (ERDA) to companies with assets over $250 million. The Justice Department would
scrutinize the proposals with an eye toward evaluating whether the contracts would increase
concentration, reduce competition, or result in conflicts of interest.
19 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. IV, 1974).
20 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
21 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
22 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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Commission Act 23 authorizes the FTC to prohibit "unfair" methods
of competition, a prohibition that embraces Sherman Act viola-
tions.2 4 All these provisions apply to restraints of trade and
monopolies affecting United States interstate and foreign commerce
if personal jurisdiction can be obtained over the offender. The
Department of Justice can bring criminal indictments (with punish-
ment up to one million dollars in fines for corporations), 25 and suits
for injunctive relief26 and damages on sales to the Government
under the Sherman Act.27 The Government can also use the Wilson
Tariff Act of 189428 to go directly after cartel-produced goods upon
their entry into the United States, but the Government has rarely
done so in recent years.2 9 In addition, there are important private
remedies for antitrust victims who stand within the relevant area of
impact.30
I
SOVEREIGN ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTS
These remedies, private and public, have been used against
private firms in circumstances where governments were actively
involved in restraining competition,31 but generally they have not
been used against the restraining government itself.32 The exact role
23 45 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
24 See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1972).
25 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV, 1974), as amended, 89 Stat. 801.
26 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1970).
27 Id. § 15a (1970).
28 Id. §§ 8-11 (1970).
29 See W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 498-543 (2d ed. 1973)
(collecting cases under Wilson Tariff Act). Very few recent cases have been brought under this
Act. When used, it has generally been in conjunction with a Sherman Act charge. See, e.g.,
United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957). The limited use of the
Wilson Act may be explained in part by Congress's failure to update its sanctions; a violation is
still a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of only $5,000. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970). The
other reason is that exclusion of foreign-produced goods, even goods produced by a cartel, has
the effect of reducing the domestic supply and will inevitably increase the price to domestic
consumers. Therefore, effective antitrust relief against a foreign cartel generally requires
more than a remedy against the goods.
30 These remedies include treble damages for past injuries (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)), and
injunctive relief to prevent repetitiofi (id. § 26 (1970)).
31 See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); United States
v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
'2 Suits have generally been attempted only when a government agency was acting in an
essentially "commercial" capacity (see text accompanying notes 92-98 infra), or where the




of the government has been an important factor in determining
whether antitrust liability exists. At least four levels of government
"political" involvement can exist with respect to private anticompeti-
tive activity: government can command as sovereign,3 3 it can for-
mally approve,3 4 it can informally encourage,3 5 or it can delegate
power that creates opportunities to restrain trade.3 6 Different anti-
trust problems arise from each level of involvement for the commer-
cial enterprise acting in reliance upon such governmental anticom-
petitive activity. In addition, as a "commercial" buyer or seller, a
sovereign government (or a state-owned corporation) can contrac-
tually command, authorize, or create anti-competitive opportu-
nity.37 It can, in essence, become a participant in a private conspir-
acy.
A. Sovereign Commands
A government may command its citizens to engage in anti-com-
petitive activity. In Parker v. Brown3 8 the Supreme Court held that
obedience of such a governmental command was a defense to a
private antitrust action where the defendant carried out the anti-
competitive activity within the territory of the commanding sove-
reign. The Parker principle has been recently reaffirmed by the
Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association,39 and in Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co. 40 Parker upheld a California raisin market stabiliza-
tion scheme, carried out directly by the state government under its
statutory power, which gave growers a voice in instigating the opera-
tion of the plan.41 Speaking loosely, it was a "primary producers'
cartel." California growers produced ninety-five percent of the
raisins consumed in the United States,42 and the clear purpose of the
scheme was to raise the price of raisins above the competitive level. 43
The Court rejected all antitrust claims against the state director of
agriculture and upheld the scheme on constitutional grounds. The
33 See text accompanying notes 38-53 infra.
34 See text accompanying notes 54-67 infra.
35 See text accompanying notes 68-77 infra.
36 See text accompanying notes 78-88 infra.
37 See text accompanying notes 89-109 infra.
38 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
39 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
40 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976). See text accompanying notes 54-59 infra.
41 317 U.S. at 346-47.
42 Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
43 39 F. Supp. at 901; 317 U.S. at 355.
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Sherman Act, the Court held, must be read as a prohibition of
individual and not state action. 4 4 Concluding that the Sherman Act
did not apply to activity commanded by a state, the Court noted:
The state in adopting and enforcing the [raisin marketing] pro-
gram made no contract or agreement and entered into no con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or to establish [a] monopoly but, as
sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which
the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.
45
In other words, the clear, unequivocal, and legal command of the
sovereign is a defense to an antitrust violation, subject to some
"territorial wrinkles." If a foreign government commands an Amer-
ican business to do something anticompetitive in that government's
territory, the firm has no problem; it can participate in a market
allocation scheme, or help the government keep other American
producers out of the market. The ancient American Banana case46
stands for at least that much.
47
If, on the other hand, a foreign sovereign commands an Amer-
ican corporation to do in the United States an act that would violate
American antitrust law, such a command should not be an antitrust
defense. The sovereign lacks the effective power to make such an
44 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
45 Id. at 352.
46 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
47 Here the Government alleged that the defendant had monopolized the Central Amer-
icah banana trade by a variety of acts-including procuring Costa Rican militia to drive the
plaintiff off its banana plantations. The Supreme Court announced a sweeping rule of
territoriality: "We think it entirely plain that what the defendant did in Panama or Costa Rica
is not within the scope of the statute so far as the present suit is concerned." 213 U.S. at 357.
This holding has been narrowed by subsequent cases. The Supreme Court has stressed
that American Banana involved direct action by the government and the case has not been
followed where a government merely approved the implementation of a private scheme. See
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 247 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927). Additionally, it has not been
followed where the government involved was merely delegating authority. See, e.g., Continen-
tal Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704-05 (1962). Thus, American
Banana now seems confined to situations involving compulsory government action, direct
commands of the state, or direct action of the state within its own territory. As the Supreme
Court said in 1952, the Banana decision
was not meant to confer blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate unlawful
consequences here, merely because they were initiated or consummated outside the
territorial limits of the United States.... As in Sisal, the crux of the complaint here is
.not merely of something done by another government at the instigation of private
parties;' petitioner by his 'own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere .... brought about
forbidden results within the United States.'
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280,288 (1952),quoting United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. at 276. See note 67 infra.
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extraterritorial command. At issue are several separate but related
concepts. The first is "sovereign immunity," which exempts a
foreign government from an antitrust or other suit simply because of
its legal status as an entity. The second concept is "Act of State,"
which essentially says that the courts of one state will not sit in
judgment on the legality of governmental action that another
sovereign state takes within its own territory. The third concept is
"foreign government compulsion," or "force majeure." This doctrine
generally exempts a private party from performing certain duties
that it would normally be required to perform, or excuses perfor-
mance or conduct that is ordinarily prohibited. This is because a
foreign government has required that the infringing conduct be
performed, or not performed, as the case may be. Normally, as with
the Act of State doctrine, this concept would be subject to territorial
limitations and would not necessarily provide immunity, except
where the government-compelled acts or omissions took place in
its own territory. 48 Finally, there is the doctrine of comity, which
may cause one state to refrain from exercising jurisdiction when
another state has a stronger interest.49 This doctrine would support
the application of American antitrust law to clearly anti-competitive
private activities within the United States, notwithstanding contrary
directives or demands based upon foreign law.
Any other approach would be untenable. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a member government of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) 50 commanded an oil company to sell
oil to independent refiners in the United States, at a price fixed by
OPEC, or not to sell oil to independent refiners in the United
States.51 If such a command were allowed as an antitrust defense,
4' See generally Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40, provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state
is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of
its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interest of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which efiforcement by action of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
50 See note I supra.
" These facts are similar to those in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). There, the Venezuelan government ordered certain
international oil companies not to provide Venezuelan oil to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was an
American company controlled by former high Venezuelan government officials. The plain-
[Vol. 61:911
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the inroads on our competitive system would be very great indeed.
Governments, already the world's leading cartelizers, would have
every reason to strengthen their cartels by issuing such broad com-
mands. A case recently instituted by the Department of Justice,
United States v. Bechtel Corporation,52 squarely raises this issue. The
complaint broadly alleges that Arab governments are ordering
American businesses, doing business in their countries, not to deal
even in the United States with "blacklisted" businesses the Arab gov-
ernments wish to punish.
53
No doubt such broad commands-which I would label "eco-
nomic bullying"--do place the bullied business in a difficult position.
What the foreign government commands, the American govern-
ment prohibits in its antitrust laws. If both sides persist, and the
business is unable to find some way to deceive one or the other, then
it may be forced to give up doing business in both places at the same
time.
B. Sovereign Approval
Sometimes a government will formally approve, under its legal
processes, privately-initiated action that would otherwise violate the
antitrust laws. That mere sovereign approval does not automatically
convey antitrust immunity is clear from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 54 which denied immunity to the
defendant for an allegedly anticompetitive utility tariff. The tariff
had been proposed by the defendant and approved by the Michigan
Public Service Commission. 55 Noting that "cases of this kind involve
tiffs purpose was to buy low-cost Venezuelan crude oil and process it, outside the American
oil quota system, at a bonded refinery in New Jersey. The oil was then to be sold for bunker
fuel in New York Harbor. Apparently, the Venezuelan government was moved by a mixture
of animosity towards the plaintiff's owners and by concern about the impact of this operation
on fuel prices generally. The district court allowed the defendant to plead the Venezuelan
government's action as a defense. Id. at 1292-93.
One might regard this as a very narrow and special case turning on the "Venezuelan" flavor
of the operation and the fact that it was operating outside the American domestic market. See
W. FUGATE, supra note 29, at 80-81. On any other grounds, the decision is wholly unsupport-
able.
52 No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976), reprinted in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 747, D-I (Jan. 20, 1976); Answer, filed by Bechtel Corp., reprinted in BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 762, at F-1 (Apr. 26, 1976).
53 Id., Complaint 15-17.
54 96 S. Ct. 3110 (1976).
In that case the defendant, a public utility, had proposed a service tariff. The plaintiff
argued that an illegal tie-in was involved. The state utility commission held a long hearing on
the overall tariff and approved it. The district court dismissed the complaint, applying Parker
v. Brown (392 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. Mich. 1974)), and the Sixth Circuit affirmed per curiam (513
F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975)).
55 96 S. Ct. at 3113-14.
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a blend of private and public decision-making,"5 6 the Court con-
trasted two polar situations. On the one hand, notwithstanding state
participation, the private party might have exercised sufficient freedom
of choice so that it could be held responsible for the consequences of
its decision. 57 On the other hand, the state might have been so
heavily involved in any choice that it would be inequitable to hold a
private party responsible for conduct implementing it.58 The Court
found the particular utility tariff in Cantor to fall closer to the first
pole, and stated that
there can be no doubt that the option to have, or not to have, such
a [tariffed] program is primarily respondent's, not the Commis-
sion's. Indeed, respondent initiated the program years before the
regulatory agency was even created.5 9
In essence, the Supreme Court was extending the logic of ear-
lier dictum. In Parker v. Brown, the Court had held that "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authoriz-
ing them to violate it." °6 0 And in its 1975 decision in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Association, the Supreme Court noted that "it is not
enough that . . . anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state
actions."'6 1 Rather, said the Court, private actions are beyond the
reach of the antitrust laws only when "the activity is required by the
State acting as sovereign ... [or] compelled by direction of the State
acting as a sovereign.1 62 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
56 Id. at 3118.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 3119.
" Id. at 3118-19. The Supreme Court justices were clearly divided on key issues. Justice
Stevens wrote an opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, and White, holding in part
that Parker v. Brown only exempted actions against state public officials. Id. at 3116-17. The
second part of the opinion included the analysis quoted in the text accompanying note
124-28 infra. Justice Blackmun concurred separately, urging a "rule of reason" analysis. Id. at
124-28. Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
urging that the conduct in issue was indeed exempt because established antitrust precedents
protected both the utility's right to petition government, and its compliance with a holding
order. Id. at 3128-40, citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
60 317 U.S. at 351.
61 421 U.S. at 791.
62 Id. at 790-91. Goldfarb involved a challenge under the Sherman Act to the legality of
fee schedules promulgated by local bar associations and "prompted" by the State Bar, an
instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Supreme Court largely disposed of
the case on the grounds that the authority given the Virginia Court of Appeals by statute to
regulate the legal profession and delegated to the State Bar, did not explicitly deal with, or
require, this action. "The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes
does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the
benefit of its members." Id. at 791. The Supreme Court's resolution of the case puts it in the
same category with Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962). See notes 78-87 infra.
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allowed mere governmental approval by a federal agency to create
an implied antitrust exemption for private conduct that would oth-
erwise violate the antitrust laws.6 3 These decisions have generally
turned on the nature of the statutory arrangements under which
approval was granted. Where a statutory scheme would be thwarted
by application of the antitrust laws, the Court has held that the
antitrust laws have been impliedly repealed by the statute.64 The
appropriate balancing test can be phrased as a question: Would
imposition of antitrust liability on a party acting with the approval of
a federal agency thwart the agency's role as assigned by Congress?
Such a balancing approach does not work where another
sovereign (a state or a foreign government) approves private con-
duct that would otherwise violate the Sherman Act. In these circum-
stances, about the best we can do is apply the strict Parker concept of
command within the domestic realm (where federal supremacy is
constitutionally provided) and work a more pragmatic accommoda-
tion where foreign government approval is involved. In essence, this
would involve applying the "rule of reason" test or some concept
of comity to a restraint formally approved by a foreign government,
even though the restraint would be per se illegal if no such approval
had been given. Applying the "rule of reason" would involve a careful
inquiry into the restraint involved, its relationship to United States
foreign commerce, the nature of the foreign government's action,
and the rationale supporting the foreign action.6 5 Where the pri-
63 See, e.g., Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) (SEC approval creates
an antitrust exemption); United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694
(1975) (SEC acquiescence can create exemption). These decisions are discussed in Baker,
Antitrust Law and Policy in the Securities Industry: A Tale of Two Days in June, 31 Bus. LAWYER 743,
745-47 (1976).
64 The standard test is whether implied repeal of the antitrust laws is necessary to make
the regulatory scheme work. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 373 U.S. 341, 357-58
(1963). The situation is clearly different where a statutory scheme provides that mere ap-
proval will carry with it antitrust immunity. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines,
409 U.S. 363 (1973). The latter situation, of course, does not apply where another sovereign (a
state or a foreign government) has given the approval in question. These bodies, by definition,
do not have the constitutional authority to grant federal antitrust exemptions.
" In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Mr. Justice Brandeis
stated the standard of inquiry in an oft-quoted passage:
But the legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a
test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual
or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, and the purpose or end sought to be obtained, are
all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objec-
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mary effects of the government-approved restraint are on the com-
merce of the country imposing the restraint, and the impact on
United States commerce is more or less incidental, then governmen-
tal approval should serve as ajustification for the restraint under the
"rule of reason" or the normal concepts of comity. At the other
extreme, where the governmentally-approved conduct significantly
affected American markets (as would be true of most world-wide
cartels), formal approval for the restraint by one or more interested
governments should not serve to justify the scheme. Clearly many
tough cases lie between the ends of such a spectrum and courts
would have to draw a line between "mercantilist" approvals designed
primarily to injure others, and "domestic regulatory" approvals
aimed at regulating the economy of the approval-granting govern-
ment.
The essential analysis is well-illustrated by United States v. Sisal
Sales Corp., 66 decided by the Supreme Court in 1927. The Govern-
ment charged that the defendant American firms had secured a
monopoly of the foreign supply sources for sisal, and this, combined
with their control over domestic stocks, gave them market control
within the United States. What they actually did depended heavily
on the special legislation they obtained from the Mexican federal and
provincial governments. However, the Supreme Court did not allow
this legislation-a form of governmental approval-to justify the
scheme under American antitrust laws:
The United States complain of a violation of their laws within
their own territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not
merely of something done by another government at the instiga-
tion of private parties. True, the conspirators were aided by dis-
criminating legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and
elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the United
States. They are within the jurisdiction of our courts and may be
punished for offenses against our laws.
67
Therefore, where the foreign government is approving a
restraint-rather than commanding it-the antitrust court usually
tionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 238.
66 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
67 Id. at 276. See also Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), in which the
Supreme Court, relying in part upon Sisal Sales, sustained jurisdiction under the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act §§ 1-45, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1127
(1970 & Supp. IV, 1974), against an American defendant who set up a business in Mexico
selling watches to Americans under a Mexican "Bulova" trademark. The result was to impair
plaintiffs goodwill in the genuine "Bulova" watches sold in the United States.
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can bind "deliberate acts" of private parties sufficient to invoke
antitrust rules.
C. Informal Sovereign Encouragement
A third situation exists where the government or government
officials merely encourage anticompetitive conduct. Encouragement
is plainly different from the command at the heart of the Parker
doctrine, and it presents particularly knotty difficulties for parties
dealing with the encouraging government. Official encouragement
may give comfort, but not immunity. This message is made particu-
larly clear in the landmark Socony-Vacuum case, 68 which involved an
earlier government-encouraged effort to prop up oil prices. Al-
though the program was never formally approved under the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),69 officials of the Department
of the Interior encouraged oil companies to engage in programs to prop
up the price of gasoline by keeping "distress gas" off the market,70
even after the NIRA itself was declared unconstitutional. 7 1 When
the Department of Justice subsequently sued, the defendant oil
companies pleaded the Interior Department's action as a defense.
The Supreme Court responded strongly:
As to knowledge or acquiescence of officers of the federal
government little need be said .... Though employees of the
government may have known of those programs and winked at
them or tacitly approved them, no immunity would have thereby
been obtained. For Congress had specified the precise manner
and method of securing immunity [under the National Industrial
Recovery Act]. None other would suffice. Otherwise national pol-
icy on such grave and important issues as this would be deter-
mined not by Congress nor by those to whom Congress had
delegated authority but by virtual volunteers.... But even had
approval been obtained for the buying programs, that approval
would not have survived the expiration in June 1935 of the Act
which was a source of that approval. . . . Hence, approval or
knowledge and acquiescence of federal authorities prior to June
1935 could have no rele'vancy to respondent's activities thereto.72
The Court reemphasized this point by adding:
The fact that the buying programs may have been consistent with
the general objectives and ends sought to be obtained under the
68 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
69 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, §§ 1-304, 48 Stat. 195.
70 310 U.S. at 225-26.
71 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
72 310 U.S. at 225-27.
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National Industrial Recovery Act is likewise irrelevant to the legal-
ity under the Sherman Act of respondent's activities either prior to
or after June 1935.73
The effect of informal governmental encouragement on anti-
trust liability was also raised in the recent Consumers Union litiga-
tion. 74 Various State Department officials had pressured a group of
foreign steel producers to enter into "voluntary import quota"
agreements in order to diminish the competitive pressure on Amer-
ican domestic producers. The defendant officials were found to
.have exceeded their legitimate authority.7 5 Hence, under Socony
Vacuum, their actions should not provide the steel companies with
any form of antitrust immunity. The facts of Consumers Union also
illustrate the practical difficulties businesses face in the political
world: the State Department had pressured foreign producers into
accepting the voluntary quotas by threatening the producers with
the possibility that Congress might enact even more restrictive
quotas. 76 Ironically, congressional action would have removed the
risk of antitrust liability for the producers, although such tough
quotas would probably have created even more anticompetitive re-
sults than the voluntary system.
7 7
73 Id. at 277-28.
74 Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), affd in part sub nom.
Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
75 Judge Gesell stated:
The President clearly has no authority to give binding assurances that a particular
course of conduct, even if encouraged by his representatives, does not violate the
Sherman Act or other related congressional enactments any more than he can grant
immunity under such laws. A flat agreement among private foreign producers
mutually to limit a substantial amount of goods to be sold in the United States is a
violation of the Sherman Act and to the extent participants are subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts criminal penalties may be imposed and civil actions for
damage or equitable relief may be pressed....
... While official assurances to this effect may or may not have been given, there is no
doubt that the companies proceeded in the belief the arrangements were legal under
our law and the quiescence of all public authorities of the United States on this score
was notable.
352 F. Supp. at 1323. Since the plaintiff had already stipulated the dismissal with prejudice, of
its antitrust claim, these comments were really quite gratuitous, and on review, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia went out of its way to disassociate itself from them:
Since there is nothing in the record that shows the Executive as purporting to
grant such an exemption, this observation by the court does not have the stature of a
declaratory disposition of an actual controversy.... [T]hese expressions of the court's
opinion are without judicial force or effect and are not appropriate for pursuit upon
appeal.
506 F.2d at 140-41 (footnote omitted).
76 See 506 F.2d at 138-39.
7 Congress ultimately enacted a provision removing antitrust liability for this type of
voluntary agreement. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2485 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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D. Sovereign Delegation of Power to Restrain
Antitrust analysis is easier where the foreign (or state) govern-
ment has been entirely passive with respect to a restraint on United
States commerce. In other words, the government involved has not
commanded, approved, or even encouraged the private firm; it has
simply delegated the power that made the restraint possible. In
these circumstances, fundamental conflict between the interests of
the sovereign and the United States government in antitrust en-
forcement is much less likely. Hence, the need for any full "rule of
reason" inquiry is less compelling than where the other sovereign
has formally approved the conduct in question. Where delegation of
governmental power is involved, the recipient of that delegation can
appropriately be held to a standard requiring it to avoid unnecessary
inroads into competitive markets.
The delegation situation is illustrated by the Supreme Court
decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.78
During World War II, Union Carbide's Canadian subsidiary had
been entrusted by the Canadian Metals Controller (a federal agency)
with "the discretionary agency power to purchase and allocate to
Canadian industries all vanadium products required by them.
79
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant subsidiary had exercised
the power to favor its own affiliates and to exclude the plaintiff from
the Canadian market.80 The Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the lower courts' rulings that this delegation of authority constituted
a defense. 8 ' It found "no indication that the Controller or any other
official within the structure of the Canadian government approved
78 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
79 370 U.S. at 703 n. 11. The Court described the governmental process as follows:
Canada's entry into World War II prompted the Canadian Government to take
extraordinary measures to assure optimum availability of strategic materials to Cana-
dian private industries engaged in the war effort. Pursuant to these measures, the
Office of Metals Controller was established and given broad powers to regulate the
procurement of the materials and to allocate them to industrial users.... The Metals
Controller enlisted the aid of [the defendant] in early 1943, delegating to it the
discretionary agency power to purchase and allocate to Canadian industries all
vanadium products required by them. The validity of these wartime measures and
delegations under Canadian law is not here contested.
Id. at 702-03 n. 11 (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 695, 702-03.
81 In describing the preceding history of the case, the Supreme Court stated that the
district court had ruled that any proposed sale of vanadium was
a transaction wholly in the hands of the Canadian Government and ... whether or
not this plaintiff was permitted to sell his material to a customer in Canada was a
matter wholly within the control of the Canadian Government.
370 U.S. at 703 (quoting unreported opinion of district court).
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or would have approved of" the allegedly monopolistic acts.8 2 The
Court also emphasized that even if the defendant's acts were per-
mitted by Canadian law, "[t]here is nothing to indicate that such law
in any way compelled discriminatory purchasing. ... ,"83 This line of
analysis underlay the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar Association. 84 The defendant State Bar was delegated
broad authority by the Virginia legislature and the Virginia Court of
Appeals to control professional standards in the legal profes-
sion.85 "The threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive
activity is state action of the type the Sherman Act was not meant to
proscribe is whether the activity is required by the State acting as
sovereign. 8 6 Only then, the Court held, is it exempt.
87
To separate these four categories-command, formal approval,
informal encouragement, and delegation of power-does not in
itself answer many hard questions facing lawyers and businessmen
in actual cases. The crucial question will frequently be: What pre-
cisely is the government doing? Is it commanding? Or is it just
authorizing, encouraging, or delegating? Less sophisticated legal
systems may leave such questions very much in doubt.
In addition, there is a related ques.tion of whether the action
involved is legal under the law of the country commanding or
approving a restraint. As a practical matter, our courts must grant
some presumption of legality to the action of foreign governments
in close cases. Nevertheless, where the foreign official or agency is
clearly acting beyond its legal powers, then its commands, or ap-
proval, should not provide the basis for granting antitrust immunity
within the United States. 88 This follows directly from the reasoning
82 370 U.S. at 706.
83 Id. at 707 (emphasis added). The Court stressed the similarity to the legislative ap-
proval obtained in United States v. Sisal Sales, 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (see note 67 supra), and the
essential difference between the voluntary nature of the conduct in Union Carbide and the
compulsory government action in American Banana (see note 47 supra). 370 U.S. at 704-05.
84 421 U.S. 773 (1975), rehearing denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1976).
85 Id. at 789-91.
16 Id. at 790.
87 Id. at 791.
88 The district court decision in Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307
F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (see note 51 supra), suggests that the legality of the command
under foreign law is not relevant. 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. The Interamerican court relied on
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), to support this conclusion. This
reasoning seems incorrect when applied to the clearly illegal foreign command in the context
of an antitrust case challenging a restraint whose anticompetitive effect is principally within
the United States. Both the plurality and dissenting opinions in Alfred Dunhill v. Republic of




of the Supreme Court's Socony-Vacuum decision. If prospective anti-
trust defendants knew they could hide behind clearly illegal com-
mands or approvals of "virtual volunteers" who happened to have
some tenuous connection with a sovereign, then they would surely
find such volunteers in sufficient quantity to obtain a broad antitrust
exemption. In other words, the prima facie legality of a. foreign
command or approval is an appropriate subject for inquiry under a
"rule of reason" test because it bears on a defendant's go6d faith.
II
"COMMERCIAL" ACTIVITIES OF GOVERNMENTS
The Parker and Goldfarb cases repeatedly stress the role of the
state "as sovereign" when discussing antitrust immunity. This sug-
gests that perhaps the state should be treated differently when it is
acting as "merchant" or as "entrepreneur." Foreign states; even in
capitalist countries, run a great many enterprises that we would
consider essentially "commercial" in nature. Many of these
enterprises-including state-owned shipping lines, air carriers,
commercial banks, and natural resource developers-directly affect
our commerce.
This raises some important questions under the preceding
analysis. Should the contractual "command" or "approval" of a
state-owned corporation be given the same effect as a parliamentary
statute or an executive order? To put the issue more baldly: Does
ownership by the state give a corporation a carte blanche to enter
into cartels that disrupt our markets? Can a government, by agree-
ment, immunize its co-conspirators?
Surely the answer to these questions must be no; yet the answer
is not an easy one. If a state-run enterprise is recognized to be
"commercial" by both the owner state and the United States, Amer-
ican antitrust law can and should be applied to it to the extent that its
activities affect our commerce, and it is subject to our jurisdiction.
Conversely, if both the United States and the foreign state would
The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing
court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own soil that
might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the conduct of our
foreign relations.
Id. at 1863 (emphasis added). The dissent stated that "the act of state doctrine commands that
the acts of a sovereign nation committed in its own territory be accorded presumptive validity."
Id. at 1876 (emphasis added). Where a clearly illegal command is directed at a party to do
something in the territory of the United States, the issue is not so much the legality of the
command, but the good faith of the antitrust defendant.
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treat the activity as "political," it should be exempt without regard to
corporate form. The truly difficult situation arises when we regard
the state-owned corporation's activities as "commercial," but the
owning state regards them as "political." Untold diplomatic difficul-
ties are likely to follow from applying American antitrust laws to
such an enterprise, and each case will have to be examined individ-
ually. Courts will be forced to judge the character of a state-run
enterprise by the law of the country owning the enterprise. In many
cases, the legal systems of the owning country will lack any great
degree of precision on such questions.8 9 To take the extreme case,
the Persian Gulf prince, asked whether his private oil drilling com-
pany was a "political" or "commercial" operation would, at best,
smile wryly- at western naivet6 and respond, "I am king." At the
worst, he would lock his questioner up instantly without due process
(conduct which sounds more "political" than "commercial! ").90
Courts and commentators have increasingly had to face this issue,
usually under the rubric of "sovereign immunity." In essence, they
have been asking whether a state-owned business enterprise is on a
different footing from more traditional state activity. 91
Several older antitrust cases deal with this issue, although not in
a wholly consistent manner. One case, In re Investigation of World
Arrangements, 92 upheld immunity based on government stock own-
ership during an earlier investigation of a possible international oil
cartel. At issue was a grand jury subpoena against Anglo-Iranian Oil
Co., Ltd., a British company in which the British government owned
a minority of the voting shares and contributed about thirty-five
percent of the company's total capital. The court treated the com-
89 The practical problem is well-illustrated by the allegations in Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). The gravamen of the complaint was an allegation that
the defendant oil companies "induced and procured" one Persian Gulf prince to claim
ownership over an area covered by the concession granted to the plaintiffs by the neighboring
prince, and that the defendants "induced and procured" the British political agent in the
Trucial States to support them. Needless to say, the complaint described a legal system that
was at best, informal. It was dismissed by the district court under the Act of State doctrine. 331
F. Supp. at 113.
" See, e.g., L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 91 (Pan Books 1947): "The Queen had
only one way of settling all difficulties, great or small. 'Off with his head!' she said without even
looking round." See generally id. 8.
11 An interesting early example occurred when the following issue was raised: Does the
doctrine of laches bar an equitable claim by a foreign government whose only interest was as a
commercial lessor of property (a mineral spring) located in the United States? French Repub-
lic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903). The Supreme Court drew a distinction
between "prosecution of a private and proprietary instead of a public or governmental right
.... Id. at 438. It also suggested that the French Government was suing for the use and
benefit of its lessee, and in both situations its tardy suit could be barred by Jaches. Id.
92 13 F.R.D. 280, 288-91 (D.D.C. 1952).
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pany as "indistinguishable from the Government of Great Britain"93
and hence cloaked with sovereign immunity. Emphasizing the his-
toric purpose of the company in supplying fuel for the Royal Navy
and Air Force, the court sought to distinguish a "public purpose"
from a purely "commercial" one.94 The second case, United States v.
Deutsches Kalisyndikat,95 upheld service upon a trading company in
which the French Government owned sixty-nine percent of the
stock. The court stressed that the company carried out purely com-
mercial transactions for private parties and noted that "the French
courts do not extend immunity to commercial enterprises owned or
controlled by a sovereign state .... "96 The third case, In re Grand
Jury Investigation of the Shipping Industry, 97 withheld decision on the
status of a shipping line owned by the Philippine Government. A
few cases applying Parker v. Brown also make the distinction between
"commercial" and "governmental" activities. 98
The more helpful decisions on governmental "commercial"
activities involve sovereign immunity outside the antitrust area. An
important case is the Second Circuit's 1964 Victory Transport deci-
sion,99 which involved an alleged breach of a shipping charter by a
Spanish government agency engaged in shipping wheat. Taking
note of "the increasing entry of governments into what had previ-
ously been regarded as private pursuits,"'100 the Second Circuit
93 Id. at 291.
94 This case may well be wrongly decided on its facts, since it seems dear that the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was run as an entirely separate enterprise and not as an arm of
the government of the United Kingdom. Moreover, it does not take account of the United
States's shift in position that year from a blanket doctrine of sovereign immunity, to the
application of a restrictive theory in order that "commercial" activities of foreign states might
still be subject to the United States law. See Letter from Acting Legal Adviser Tate of the
Department of State to Attorney General Perlman, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). The
United States continues to adhere to that theory. See generally, Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976).
95 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
96 Id. at 202.
97 186 F. Supp. 298, 318-20 (D.D.C. 1960).
98 See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972). In that case the District of Columbia Armory Board (an unincorporated instru-
mentality of the District of Columbia government) was subjected to the antitrust laws for the
"commercial" act of entering into a long-term, exclusionary stadium lease with the Washing-
ton Redskins football team. The Court of Appeals stressed that
what Congress did not do is create the Board as an instrumentality to own and
manage the only professional football team to be allowed to play in the stadium;
hence, neither the Board nor the Redskins in this case are performing a function that
a purely governmental agency itself could have performed.
Id. at 939.
99 Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transports, 336
F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
100 Id. at 357.
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applied a
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity [in order] ... to try to
accommodate the interest of individuals doing business with
foreign governments in having their legal rights determined by
the courts, with the interest of foreign governments in being free
to perform certain political acts without undergoing the embar-
rassment or hindrance of defending the propriety of such acts
before foreign courts. 101
The court thus found that the charter of a ship to haul grain by a
state instrumentality was an activity that would justify applying the
"restrictive theory of sovereign immunity."'1 2 It put weight on both
the nature of the activity and the "commercial" terms of the charter.
10 3
Some of the same thinking can be found in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,10 4 which held that the Act of State
doctrine would not protect a foreign sovereign's repudiation of a
commercial debt'0 5 "arising out of the operation of a commercial
business by one of its instrumentalities.' ' 0 6 Relying primarily on
older tax exemption cases,10 7 the plurality opinion "drew a line...
between the historically recognized governmental functions of a
State and businesses engaged in by a State of the kind which there-
tofore had been pursued by private enterprise.' 01 8 In reaching its
conclusion that the Act of State doctrine did not apply to the com-
101 Id. at 360.
102 Id. at 360-61.
103 Id.
104 96 S. Ct. 1854 (1976). This is an extremely complicated case arising from the
nationalization of traditional cigar suppliers by the Republic of Cuba. The Republic sued for
payment on cigars delivered prior to nationalization; the American importers counterclaimed
on certain post-nationalization transactions. Cuba sought to plead the "Act of State" defense
(see text accompanying note 48 supra) to the latter obligations. The Supreme Court was closely
divided on the issues. Justice White, writing for himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, concluded that the Act of State doctrine did not protect the Republic of
Cuba. Id. at 1861. Justice Stevens concurred (id. at 1871), thus providing a five member
majority, Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion for the remaining four members of the
Court. Id.
105 Id. at 1863.
106 Id. at 1866.
107 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553
(1957); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175 (1936); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934); and South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437 (1905) were cited by the Court at 96 S. Ct. 1854, 1862.
108 96 S. Ct. at 1862. It quoted earlier tax cases in support of its argument. The Court
quoted Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934): "When a state enters the market place
seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereigntypro tanto, and takes on the character of
a trader .... 96 S. Ct. at 1862. It then asserted that "[ilt is thus a familiar concept that 'there is
a constitutional line between the State as government and the State as trader ......."Id. at 1862,
quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579 (1946).
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mercial activity at issue, the plurality drew heavily on the restrictive
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 10 9
Both the Victory Transport and Alfred Dunhill cases use historical
and traditional criteria to determine if an enterprise is "commercial"
in nature. Another approach to the question is to ask: How impor-
tant is the activity to the economy of the state imposing the restraint?
Some would argue that any truly important economic activity is
necessarily "political," since most countries today view the manage-
ment of their own economies as a central mission of government.
Without doubt, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait would regard production
and pricing of oil as not only a political question, but the political
question within their borders. Jamaica would take the same position
regarding its massive bauxite reserves. This approach would label an
activity "political" if the government involved regarded it as too
important to be left to the market. Such an approach might not
change the status of such activities as running an airline, a stadium,
or a bank-these would still be "commercial"-but it might require
that many other things we .presently classify as "commercial," be
reclassified as "political."
A determination under this test, that a foreign state-owned
enterprise was not "commercial," need not be determinative of an
American party's liability for voluntarily participating with the
state-owned enterprise in conduct violating American antitrust law.
The inquiry might focus, in part, on whether the American corpora-
tion had engaged in a "commercial" relationship with such a foreign
state-owned enterprise, or whether the relationship was "sovereign."




Governmental interests-whether labeled "political," "commer-
cial," or "mercantilist"-have created several related antitrust prob-
lems in recent years. The first arises when governments serve as
cartel managers-seeking to restrict supply, raise prices, and gener-
ally control markets. The second problem occurs when a govern-
ment seeks to get American commercial firms to boycott other
American firms that the government disapproves of for "political"
reasons. The third problem occurs when a government vests de
facto monopoly power in private suppliers, normally by price regu-
lation that creates a supply shortage. Private firms may run serious
109 96 S. Ct. at 1863-66.
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antitrust risks in all of these situations. The recent "cartel" and
"boycott" problems have generally had foreign origins. However,
the "de facto monopoly" problem has arisen here largely as a result
of federal price regulation which has created product shortages in
oil and other key markets. Although the application of United States
antitrust rules may be more limited in the foreign context," ° anti-
trust analysis should follow the same broad lines at home and
abroad.
A. Risks Created by Government-Organized Cartels
The biggest and most successful of the international producer
cartels fully illustrates the problem in this area. The Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, after several years of unsuccessful
efforts to raise international oil prices, struck gold in late 1973. The
Arab oil boycott, organized for largely political reasons in the wake
of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, created an instant and very dramatic
oil shortage throughout the industrialized world. Prices naturally
rose quickly. OPEC exploited this situation by taking over as a cartel
manager. Since then, it has sought to peg all oil prices to certain
grades of light Arabian crude oil."' As a practical matter, the task
has become increasingly difficult. High prices have lessened demand
for oil thereby increasing the temptation for individual OPEC mem-
bers to "cheat" on prices. 112 There has, of course, been profit in this
whole arrangement for the international oil companies.' '3 At the
same time, OPEC's new-found muscle has produced political risks to
these same companies, with producer states increasingly either na-
tionalizing production facilities or demanding larger ownership
110 See Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?, 8 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 16 (1974). The United States antitrust interest falls into two areas: where there is a
direct restraint on the American import market, and where there is a restraint on the export
business opportunities for American firms. The rules apply to all within reach of ourjurisdic-
tion regardless of the origin of the restraints. If the parties intend to restrain our import
competition, or American export opportunities, then the restraints will be reached. In my
view, however, the law does not reach restraints practiced abroad for the purpose of restrain-
ing the trade of businesses and consumers in other countries, so long as there is no immediate
or direct effect on United States import competition or competitive export opportunities for
American firms.
I See generally prepared statement of G.T. Piercy, Senior Vice President and Director,
Exxon Corp., Hearings on Multinational Petroleum Companies and Foreign Policy Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., pt. 5, at 211-17 (1974) [hereinafter Senate Multinational Hearings]. See also id. at 288, 296
(charts).
112 See, e.g., Wall St.J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 19, col. 1. This is a normal problem for cartels.
See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 290-93 (2d ed. 1974).
'13 See, e.g., the fourfold increase in per barrel profits for Aramco between 1972 and
1974. Senate Multinational Hearings, supra note 111, pt. 7, at 177.
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shares of producer companies. 1 4 In response, the international oil
companies have sought to bargain jointly with OPEC member-states
in order to avoid being picked off one by one. 115 As beneficiaries of
the OPEC action, the companies also had to avoid the danger of
becoming a private cartel dedicated to serving the interests of the
OPEC governments.
The antitrust risks in such situations are obvious. It is hornbook
law that private parties cannot manipulate product market prices,
even for ostensibly good "political" purposes. Thus, in Socony-
Vacuum'1 6 the major oil companies were successfully prosecuted for
propping up midwestern "spot" market prices by collectively buying
up "distress" gasoline before it reached the market. Even though
performed with at least informal governmental encouragement, the
companies' action was a per se violation. It is also hornbook law that
if a group of competitors accepts a plan of a third party to restrain
commerce, that group can be guilty of conspiracy to violate the
antitrust laws. In the important Interstate Circuit case, 1 7 a group of
suppliers was successfully prosecuted for accepting a major cus-
tomer's invitation to raise the prices charged to that customer's'
smaller competitors. It is not clear that the initiator of such a con-
spiracy need itself be subject to the antitrust law, for common accep-
tance of the proposal by direct competitors formed the basis of the
conspiracy. Thus, looking at an analogous area, a group of compet-
ing employers can at times be successfully prosecuted for accepting
an anticompetitive plan put to them by an exempt labor union." 8 So
long as the producers are in the role of parties obeying the com-
mands of various sovereigns and are carrying out these commands
abroad, they need not fear liability under the Interstate Circuit doc-
trine. However, to the extent that the oil companies become volun-
tary partners in implementing a cartelization scheme, they run the
risk of having the whole arrangement treated as a private conspir-
acy. Antitrust law makes an appropriate distinction, clearly seen in
the Sisal Sales and Continental Ore decisions, between deliberate or
discretionary private acts, and those required by government.
114 See, e.g., Senate Multinational Hearings, supra note 111, pt. 5, at 229-31 (chronology of
producer-country demands).
115 See generally correspondence 1971-73 betweenJohnJ. McCloy (attorney for the major
oil companies) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, reprinted in Senate
Multinational Hearings, supra note 111, pt. 6, at 223-70.
16 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
117 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
118 See Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). Liability depends on
whether the union's proposal is an appropriate bargaining area. See Local 189 Amalgamated




Cooperation in order to present a "common bargaining front"
in dealing with a government-sponsored cartel raises practical anti-
trust problems. Members of the bargaining group must cooperate
on commercially sensitive matters, ranging from price and product
availability, to broader issues of commercial strategy. Such efforts
may necessarily affect product availability in various markets and
may result in greater uniformity of cQmmercial practice among
those involved. Again, the analogy to the labor area seems persua-
sive. In the typical multi-employer bargaining situation, a group of
employers join together to bargain with an exempt party, a labor
union. Although such bargaining may threaten the competitive pro-
cess, it is usually allowed out of a sense of equity in order to protect
an ultimate consumer interest in not having the employers "picked
off' one by one. The antitrust issue is most clearly focused where
various employers establish mutual assistance pacts, in which they
collectively agree to shut down the supply in the market. Such
mutual assistance pacts are quite common in a number of fields' 19
including newspaper publishing in particular cities-yet they have
passed unchallenged by the Government. The only such pact chal-
lenged on antitrust grounds was upheld.120
The type of problem involved in "mutual aid" efforts is well-
illustrated by Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil of California. 121
The plaintiffs were two New York utilities that depended on
Libyan sources for their low-sulphur oil requirements. The de-
fendants were a group of oil companies operating in Libya and
119 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95 nn.23, 24 (1957).
120 Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 211 F. Supp. 478 (1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 (1963). This case may have been poorly pleaded by the plaintiff
railway union which challenged a mutual assistance pact entered into by a number of railroads
to deal with "whip-saw" strikes. The plaintiff focused on restraints on competition for
labor-which the court held to be exempt-rather than on restrictions in the markets where
the employers competed. The point at issue was an "insurance" scheme and hence it did not
involve any lock-outs having direct market impact. The issue has been raised several times
before the Civil Aeronautics Board. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. CAB, 502 F.2d 453
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975). Airline employees challenged the Civil
Aeronautics Board's (CAB) approval of amendments to the airlines' Mutual Aid Pact. Under
the Mutual Aid Pact, created in 1958, strike-bound companies received certain payments from
other Pact members. Later amendments provided for "supplemental payments." Petitioners
challenged the increase in supplemental payment rates, the higher ceiling on individual
carrier liability, and the CAB's approval of a 1971 amendment authorizing participation of
local carriers. By way of dicta, the court pointed out that the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §
1486(e)(1970), specifically exempted agreements approved by the CAB from operation of the
antitrust laws. Id. at 457. In an earlier opinion concerning the Pact's validity, the CAB con-
cluded that the Pact neither restrained trade nor lessened competition. See id. at 457 n.15
(1974).
' Long Island Lighting Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
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elsewhere in the Middle East. The defendants had refused to extract
and ship Libyan oil in order both to counter Libyan threats to
nationalize their oil operations, and to deter other Arab govern-
ments from making similar threats. 122 As a result of this collective
action, the plaintiff utilities were deprived of the low-sulphur oil for
which they had contracted. 2 3 They sued, alleging a group boycott
under the Sherman Act. The complaint was dismissed on the
ground that the boycott was directed at the governments involved,
rather than at the plaintiffs, and therefore the plaintiffs (even if
injured) lacked standing under the so-called "target area" doctrine
of antitrust law. 124 The court did not reach a decision on the legal
implications of the defendant's collective action. It did note, how-
ever, that the collective effort was aimed in part at strengthening the
bargaining hand and staying power of those smaller producers who
lacked substantial alternative reserves from outside of Libya. 25 The
fact that the "targets" of the alleged "conspiracy" were sovereigns
engaged in manipulating an international cartel reduced any practi-
cal risk that they could or would bring an antitrust suit against the oil
companies' actions.'
2 6
The question of mutual assistance in joint bargaining efforts
was considered by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice in business reviews that were given to the major oil com-
panies prior to their negotiations with the OPEC cartel in 1971. The
oil companies wanted to negotiate jointly and cooperate in other
122 Id. at 1272-73.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971). In fact the plaintiffs were not the direct purchasers of the Libyan oil, but
bought it from an intermediate company. This presented additional "target area" problems
that did not turn out to be controlling The Second Circuit has recognized that "any antitrust
violation may produce ripple effects of injury quite far removed from the immediate target of
the violation .... [E]ven parties whose injuries may be both immediate and foreseeable may
lack standing to pursue a private remedy if that injury is indirect or incidental, or if their
business is not in the target area of the allegedly illegal acts. Long Island Lighting Co. v.
Standard Oil Co. 521 F.2d 1269, 1273-74 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976).
125 521 F.2d at 1272.
126 The exact standing of foreign sovereigns who recover in United States courts for
United States antitrust violations is an important issue at this time. See Note, The Capacity of
Foreign Sovereigns to Maintain Private Antitrust Actions, 9 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 137 (1975). This is
true even where the antitrust violation is clear on its face and takes place in the United States.
Even if a foreign sovereign can recover in such circumstances, it by no means follows that
foreign governments engaged in cartelizing should be able to sue American firms under the
United States antitrust laws for overseas conduct of a "counter-cartel" nature. Although inpari
delicto is not regarded as a defense to private antitrust suits in most instances (see, e.g., Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968)), that line of cases seems to
rest both on the thought that the plaintiff was to some extent the unwilling victim, and on the
overriding interest in having the antitrust laws enforced by private plaintiffs. Neither consid-
eration seems applicable to the cartel-creating sovereign.
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ways in dealing with OPEC concerning contemplated price increases
and the Libyan expropriation efforts at issue in the Long Island
Lighting case. 127 The Department granted the business review re-
quest on a limited scale. In 1974 the Department explained its
action:
The Division felt, at that time, that the Libyan sharing agreement
seemed to provide important protection for smaller oil companies
operating in Libya which had no other alternative sources of
crude oil .... These proposed actions raised novel antitrust issues,
but our files indicate it was then believed that these actions were
necessary as a countervailing force to the producer cartel with
which the oil companies were confronted, and that these actions
would more likely have a beneficial than an adverse effect on U.S.
foreign commerce. It is important to recall that the stated intent of
these proposed arrangements was to maintain oil prices at lower
levels than would exist if the OPEC nations could negotiate with
companies one-by-one; increasing the terms required for settle-
ment with each negotiation.
128
In 1973 the oil companies requested a further business re-
view, 129 and the Antitrust Division conducted an extensive review of
its own to assure that the companies had not gone beyond the
limited approval given in the prior letter.' 30 A new business review
letter authorized the companies to engage in joint bargaining with
OPEC in Vienna in 1973."' The Antitrust Division made clear that
its approval was limited:
our non-disapproval is in no way intended to sanction or authorize
any joint oil company action which tends to reduce the supply of
petroleum to the United States, such as joint agreements with
OPEC concerning production levels or refinery construction, or
joint agreements among oil companies to halt production or cease
lifting oil in any country, to boycott oil from any country, or to
chase so-called "hot oil."
1 32
Cooperative bargaining among those dealing with a government-
sponsored cartel should create no antitrust liability if done prop-
erly. The cooperating parties must show that they will direct their
efforts only at the other side and that their cooperation will not
have any unnecessarily broad impact on competition in the domestic
127 521 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975).
128 Testimony of Thomas E. Kauper, former Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Department of Justice, in Senate Multinational Hearings, supra note 111, pt. 9, at 45, 47.
129 Id. at 47.





market or on the export opportunities for American firms. 133 The
cases will inevitably turn on their facts. What, in effect, was the
purpose of the agreement? Was it unnecessarily broad? Did it touch
on matters not absolutely necessary to the joint bargaining mutual
assistance efforts? All these questions will be crucial.
A final antitrust problem arises when a group of firms dealing
with a government or a government cartel uses improper means to
influence the government (or the cartel) to take anticompetitive
measures. 34 As a general rule, private firms may urge any govern-
ment to take anticompetitive action. However, this principle-which
also seems applicable in the international area' 3 5 -- is subject to some
important qualifications. To start with, antitrust law may still apply if
the government involved is engaged in "commercial" relations with
the private firms, such as procurement of goods or services. 136
Second, antitrust liability may be appropriate where private firms
cover up activities by lying, and thereby cause the government to
take anticompetitive steps which it might not otherwise take. The
general principle was developed in connection with frauds on the
Patent Office, 137 but has much broader ramifications. It was applied
to a collective attempt by oil producers to cause a government
regulatory body to hold down new production in oil, where the
producers filed false production forecasts with the government in
order to accomplish the desired result. 138 In a business environment
dominated by government cartels, private firms engaged in collec-
tive lying might well be subject to antitrust liability if their efforts
succeeded in causing a government-dominated cartel or its member
governments to restrict competitive imports into the United States
or to restrict export opportunities for American firms abroad. This
113 See United States v. Minnesota Mining Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965 (D. Mass. 1950).
'14 United Mineworkers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. President's
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
"5 Cf. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
136 See Whitten v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 33 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 850 (1970); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1047 (1972). The issue seems analogous to that raised in Victory Transport and other sovereign
immunity cases discussed in text accompanying notes 92-103 supra.
137 See Walker Process Equip. Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965),
which held that a patent holder who procures a patent by fraud may be sued for attempted
monopoly or monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, provided that the normal § 2
requirements of actual or threatened control of a relevant market can be established. Walker
Process builds on Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945), which held that a party knowing of fraud on the patent office can be denied
equitable patent law remedies for infringement.
"138 Woods Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972).
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may be a factor in limiting the full range of options open to a group
of private firms engaged in negotiating collectively with a cartel.
To summarize, a governmental cartel made up entirely of
sovereign states is almost surely exempt from American antitrust
laws. Nevertheless, if the "core" cartel is exempt, private companies
are subject to antitrust liability if they implement and carry out
voluntarily the desires of the cartel and if their actions have the
necessary effect on American import or interstate trade. At the same
time, private companies need reasonable latitude to develop a com-
mon front in negotiating with a cartel. They should be able to obtain
the necessary flexibility under the "rule of reason." The practical
question is: Are the private companies mere buyers from the cartel,
or are they implementors or orchestrators of the cartel? As long as
their relationships with the cartel remain very much an arms-length
or involuntary affair, private firms should not face serious antitrust
problems for most activities. The one key exception, already dis-
cussed, is where the government cartel seeks to compel the private
firms to take action within the United States which would violate
American antitrust law. 139
B. Risks Created by Government-Organized Political Boycotts
Many of the same antitrust questions are raised by the
government-organized political boycott, a similarity noted by the
Justice Department in the Bechtel Corporation case.' 40 Typically, Arab
governments have refused to do business with "Zionist" firms. They
maintain "blacklists" and a "Central Office for the Boycott of Israel"
to police the boycott. The governments in turn have pressured
private firms with which they deal not to patronize blacklisted firms.
This boycott has become visible in manufacturing industries and in
such service fields as securities underwriting and finance. It pro-
vides the basis for the Government's Bechtel case.
In fact, two separate but overlapping boycotts may form "the
Arab boycott." The first boycott-which we might call the "core"
boycott-involves Arab governments and state trading corporations.
The governments and corporations directly agree among them-
selves: (1) to bar blacklisted firms from operating in their countries;
(2) not to deal with blacklisted firms; and (3) to pressure others not
to deal with "blacklisted" firms. The second boycott-which we
might label "peripheral"-occurs when this "core" boycott combina-
139 See notes 46-52 supra.
140 United States v. Bechtel Corp., C.A. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976). See
notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
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tion pressures one or more businesses into agreeing not to deal with
blacklisted firms.
The "core" boycott seems clearly exempt from United States
antitrust law since it involves "political" commands by foreign
sovereigns within their own territory. On the other hand, the "pe-
ripheral" boycott may raise the type of significant antitrust risks
revealed in the Bechtel case.
Commercial boycotts are severely dealt with under the Sherman
Act.' 41 Because they are inherently coercive and restrain individual
company choice, 142 such boycotts are said to be illegal per se, without
requiring proof that competition is actually harmed.143 An impor-
tant part of the anti-boycott rationale is that a systematic boycott
becomes "an extra-governmental agency" that "trenches on the
power of the national legislature.' 44 If a purely private combination
can produce this undersirable effect, so too can a foreign govern-
ment-induced combination.
In fact, our courts have been somewhat ambivalent in applying
boycott rules to political or ideological boycotts as opposed to eco-
nomic ones. Two relatively recent court of appeals decisions illus-
trate this ambivalence. In one case, the Sixth Circuit struck down a
collective plan of a local board of realtors not to show houses in
"white" areas to black buyers, although the realtors did not benefit
economically from the boycott.' 45 In the second case, an educational
association of non-profit colleges and schools refused to consider for
accreditation a proprietary college, thereby depriving it of certain
government funds and other benefits.1 46 The association reasoned
that profit-making educational institutions were bound to have
141 See Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (blacklist of "style pi-
rates"); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)
(blacklist of direct-dealing wholesalers).
142 The basic per se rule applies only to collective boycotts, because Sherman Act § 1 only
reaches multi-firm conduct. In fact, the courts have not applied the per se test where the
collective refusal to deal was merely incidental to some legitimate joint activity, and was
arguably necessary to carry it out. See Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard,
Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974) (bank credit card joint
venture); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178
(5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973) (tour listings). See also Cement Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925). Even if there is no collective refusal, an
individual refusal to deal may be reached under Sherman Act § 2, if a firm holds a monopoly
position, or might acquire one by these tactics. See Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S.
143 (1951). See notes 162-63 and accompanying text infra.
143 Klor's Inc. v. Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
144 Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
145 Bratcher v. Akron Area Bd. of Realtors, 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967).
146 Marjorie Webster Jr. Coll., Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colls. & Secondary Schools,
432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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lower academic standards and hence could not be accredited. A
divided District of Columbia Circuit held that this was essentially a
matter of educational standards, not of economics. 147 The practical
message seems to be that the political nature of the core Arab
boycott may allow others to raise the political question as a defense
to their own peripheral activities, btit it is far from dear that such a
defense will or should be allowed.
The Bechtel case illustrates some of the problems in this area.
Bechtel Corporation and various majority-controlled subsidiaries
are alleged to have conspired with various unnamed (and un-
defined) co-conspirators to implement in the United States148 an
agreement
(a) To refuse to deal with Blacklisted Persons as Subcontractors in
connection with Major Construction Projects in Arab League
Countries; and
(b) To Require Subcontractors to refuse to deal with Blacklisted
Persons in connection with Major Construction Projects in Arab
League Countries in which any defendant acted as a Prime Con-
tractor.1
49
In furtherance of the conspiracy, the parties were alleged to have
done various things-including "obtaining lists or other identifica-
tion of Blacklisted Persons.' 1 50 The Government alleged that the
boycott had the effect of excluding blacklisted Americans from Arab
projects, restricting American exports, and denying American sub-
contractors freedom of choice in dealing.
Bechtel is a suit limited to situations where boycott agreements
involving essentially foreign parties are implemented by a firm (or
firms) in the United States and have the effect of checking the flow
of domestic trade and American export opportunities. In essence, as
a matter of conspiracy law, the defendant, Bechtel, is treated as
having become a member of the foreign conspiracy.' 5 ' The boycott
issue can, however, arise in a variety of ways where the American
firms can themselves be said to have created a boycott in the United
States.
The first type of situation would in essence be an Interstate Circuit
147 Id. at 658.
148 Complaint in United States v. Bechtel Corp., C.A. No. 76-99 (N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 16,
1976), reprinted in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 747, D-1 (Jan. 20, 1976).
"I Id. at 21.
150 Id. at 22.
"5t The Sherman Act requirement of a "contract, combination or conspiracy" has been
found to be met even where coercion rather than consent was the basis for the "agreement."
See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 41-42 (1960).
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type conspiracy. 152 In other words, several American firms, operat-
ing in the United States and selling abroad, could each individually
agree with an Arab government or state trading corporation not to
deal with blacklisted firmsfor any purposes-each such firm knowing
that exactly the same proposition is being put to its principal com-
petitors. Here, a boycott agreement among the competitors might be
implied, especially if the American competitors seem to have will-
ingly accepted the Arab offer or profited by doing so. 153 A key
element in finding such an agreement will be whether the action can
be said to be interdependent in the sense that each firm's conduct
depends on similar conduct by others.
54
A second type of situation occurs where an Arab member of the
core boycott deals in the United States with a group of American
firms. For example, assume that the members of an American un-
derwriting syndicate refuse to include in their group a New York
firm blacklisted by the Arabs. 155 This might occur because the Arab
issuer of the securities insisted on the issuer's traditional right to
select the members of its underwriting syndicate. Alternatively, syn-
dicate members might fear that if a blacklisted New York firm were
included in a domestic underwriting, other issuers might refuse to
deal with the syndicate members on future underwritings. The first
case is at least close, since the boycott arguably comprises unilateral
conduct by the Arab issuer. The second is dearly a boycott punisha-
ble under the Sherman Act section 1 per se rules.
A third type of situation occurs where American firms agree to
take ancillary action that facilitates the overseas "core" boycott. For
example, the firms might furnish the Arabs information about their
suppliers, customers, or blacklisted firms. Such action is collective
and makes the boycott effective, and might thus establish antitrust
liability if it resulted in restraint of competition in American mar-
kets.
152 See notes 117-18 and accompanying text supra.
153 It is interesting that in the landmark case of Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914), the extent of the horizontal "agreement" was fairly
weak. In fact, the Court was willing to infer that the firms receiving the "blacklist" would
operate in a concerted manner largely because it was in their economic interest as a group to
do so. Id. at 608-09.
154 Compare Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537
(1954), with Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). See Turner, The
Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 655 (1962).
"' The membership of a syndicate will change with each offering. In essence, each




Boycott liability under American law is much more unlikely
when the conduct takes place abroad and is directed at nationals of
other countries. For example, suppose that a London underwriting
group, composed of British and American firms, excluded a particu-
lar London firm blacklisted by Arabs from an underwriting for an
Arab issuer. Here, there is no direct impact on American commerce
and hence no basis for invoking United States law. This would
follow even if the issuer for the particular underwriting were Amer-
ican since the restraint would fall on a British firm. If, on the other
hand, the London boycott were directed at a blacklisted American
issuer, then liability might theoretically be possible, since the action
might restrain the importation of capital into America.
The practical boycott issues essentially involve peripheral in-
volvement by American firms (or those refusing to deal with them)
in a "core" boycott run by Arab governments. Direct application of
United States law against the governments is not realistic. Any
United States legal action is likely to be directed against activity at
the periphery of the boycott.
C. Risks of De Facto Monopoly Created by Government-Caused Shortages
Governments can create monopoly power in different ways.
The government can directly grant a monopoly, as in Continental
Ore. 156 Government embargoes may create monopoly. Government
price regulation may indirectly create monopoly power among
suppliers if the regulated price is held below the normal market-
clearing price. As a result of such regulation, some buyers, who
would have left the market had the price been allowed to rise, stay in
the market. Meanwhile, existing sellers who would have stayed in
the market may drop out, and new entrants may stay out, depending
in both cases on their effective alternatives and the duration of the
price regulation.
157
Price regulation creates an imbalance of demand, but some
alternative for leveling that imbalance must be found. One means is
by queuing. Long lines at the gasoline pumps in 1974 forced out
those unwilling to put up with the queue-those whose demand
function for time was above average. Another means is by
rationing-formal or informal-according to some reasonable for-
156 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
57 The economic concepts are both simple and fundamental. Normal supply and de-
mand schedules will cause an available quantity (q) to clear the market at an equilibrium price
(p). However, government then decides that p is "too high" to be politically acceptable, so it
imposes a lower regulated price (pr). This will in turn call forth a demand for a higher quantity
(qd) which is by definition not available. Meanwhile, p. will cause supply to contract to a lower
quantity (q,). As a result, there is a shortage of qd - o,.
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mula. Still a third is arbitrary favoritism, based on friendship,
under-the-table considerations, or other special factors.
As a practical matter, during 1973-74 many suppliers had to
make affirmative decisions as to how to allocate production among
their customers. Suppliers were turned into de facto monopolists
vis-4-vis their traditional customers. During such a general supply
shortage, the customers could not turn to new suppliers as they
would in a competitive market. In other words, each supplier was
dealing with customers who had few market choices. Thus, the
supplier exercised effective monopoly power.
The use of this government-created monopoly power must be a
matter of antitrust concern. Monopoly power may be used to favor
one customer over others. It may be used to discipline price cutters
and innovators. Integrated firms may use their power to gain advan-
tages over unintegrated competitors, Suppliers may force customers
to accept contract packages favoring the supplier. Such de facto
grants of monopoly power raise serious issues.
This type of situation does not fit conveniently into the estab-








In the long run the slopes of the Supply and Demand schedules tend to become less steep
as customers and suppliers adjust more completely to conditions; therefore, the difference
between qd and q. will become greater over time-making the total shortage problem more
acute. See generally R. ECKHAUS, BASIc EcONOMics 412-28 (1972).
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created by price regulation is superficially quite different from that
with which courts have generally been concerned in monopolization
cases. Normally, courts have defined "monopoly power" as the
power to "control the price and exclude competition in the mar-
ket."'158 The market share of the alleged monopolist has usually been
determinative in the leading cases.159 Such power has normally been
found where a competitor had over two-thirds of the relevant mar-
ket.' 60 Under traditional standards, a firm with the requisite market
share that has maintained its position by means not honestly indus-
trial has violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The traditional learning does not deal with monopoly power
created by means other than control of an overwhelming share of
the primary market. Yet the law is broad enough, and I believe
flexible enough, to deal with other forms of monopoly power. Thus,
for example, a firm with a very small part of a supply-short market
may in fact have monopoly power, without regard to its actual
percentage share. Where the evidence proves monopoly power, it is
altogether appropriate to treat such a firm in exactly the same way as
a traditional monopolist.
The practical implications of doing this are important. An ordi-
nary businessman may refuse to deal with anyone for whatever
reasons he wants.' 6' A "monopolist" cannot do this.' 62 In essence,
the monopolist is made into a common carrier, subject to the duty of
dealing with all on non-discriminatory terms.'
6 3
This principle has important implications in a supply-shortage
situation. In such a situation, the "monopolist" does not have
enough to go around and is barred by government from raising
prices to reduce demand. This makes the "common carrier" duty to
treat all customers equitably a particularly significant one, because,
without it, the economy would be subjected to a regime of fa-
voritism, distortion, and "under the table" deals. The monopolist
must develop a rational, even-handed scheme of allocation known to
S8 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).
159 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
160 In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), Judge
Learned Hand suggested that 90% would surely qualify as monopoly power, 64% might do so,
and 30% clearly would not. Id. at 424.
161 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
162 Lorain Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
163 The implications of this principle have been most fully developed in cases involving
joint venture monopolies. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); United
States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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those who are interested. Some basic due process is required.16 4 In
addition, antitrust law would place on the de facto monopolist the
burden of showing that the allocation scheme was not unnecessarily
restrictive.
165
At least two types of allocation plans are possible. One plan
would allocate resources on a "first come, first served" basis. This is
the way common carriers have traditionally worked. 166 Of course,
this would require that reasonable notice of the use of this approach
be made available to all potential customers, so that there are no
"insiders" with a preferred status. The obvious analogy is to the
general requirement that common carriers operate on the basis of
previously published tariffs. 167 After such notice, orders could be
allocated in the order received.
The second possible approach would work reasonably well
where continuing customer-supplier relationships existed. Here, re-
sources would be allotted on a pro rata basis in accordance with
traditional volumes of purchase. Each customer would receive a
percentage of his historic use. This is generally the way that gov-
ernment rationing schemes have operated. 68 Because this method
of allocation discriminates against new entrants in the business, 69 it
works better for short-term shortages than long-term ones.
164 Interestingly, ideas of procedural due process were at the heart of one of the leading
cases on access to an essential facility. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch. Inc., 373 U.S. 341
(1963).
165 The "rule of reason" standard used in Sherman Act § I cases frequently focuses on
the question of whether an action is unnecessarily restrictive. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
166 The common carrier's duty of serving all comers on nondiscriminatory terms means
that such a carrier "is, in general, bound to take the goods of all who offer, unless his complement
for the trip is full .... Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 22 (1858) (emphasis
added). See also Mount Tom Motor Line, Inc. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 325 Mass. 45,
47-48, 89 N.E. 2d 3, 5-6 (1949). Common carrier concepts have had very broad application
beyond the haulage of freight and passengers by transportation firms. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 228 N.Y. 475, 480, 127 N.E. 584, 585 (1920).
167 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 203 (1970) (communications carriers); 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1970)
(surface transportation carriers).
168 The mandatory fuel allocation scheme used by the Federal Energy Administration
(FEA) operates in this manner. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 211 (1976), especially § 211. 10, which
deals with allocation procedures for sellers, and the specific allocation formulas in§§ 211.67,
(old oil), 211.83 (propane), 211.93 (butane and natural gas), 211.103 (motor gasoline),
211.123 (middle distillate), 211.143 (aviation fuel), 211.163 (residual fuel oil), 211.183
(naphthas), and 211.203 (other products). Here the Government applies very different per-
centage allocations to different classes of customers based on its judgment as to social impor-
tance. An unregulated seller would run serious (and appropriate) antitrust risks if it sought to
do this. Instead, the unregulated seller must stick to across-the-board percentage allocations.
169 The FEA mandatory fuel allocation regulations do seek to deal with this problem by
creating special schemes for new suppliers (10 C.F.R. § 211.10(e) (1976)) and new wholesale
buyers (10 C.F.R. § 211.12(e) (1976)).
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The vertically-integrated supplier has special problems in a
shortage situation. It cannot be permitted to use its temporary de
facto monopoly to squeeze unintegrated customers out of the busi-
ness. In the closely analogous Alcoa case,170 the defendant was found
to have used a monopoly at the supply level to force unintegrated
fabricators out of the market.' 7 1 What the defendant did was prac-
tice a "price squeeze" of holding its aluminum ingot price high in
relation to its finished fabricated aluminum products, thus making it
difficult, and in most cases impossible, for a non-integrated fabricat-
ing competitior to survive. 172 The assumption was that Alcoa
"charged" its fabricating divisions the same price as it charged
non-integrated fabricators. The same principles apply with even
greater force where the monopoly defendant favored its own fab-
ricating divisions on terms of dealing-or refused to deal with its
non-integrated customers altogether.1 73 Of course, where govern-
ment regulation holds down prices in the primary market and
thereby prevents a "price squeeze," the integrated monopolist has to
look to other forms of "squeezes" to reach the same result. TheAlcoa
message seems clear: vertically-integrated firms must treat their own
operations and non-integrated customers the same in times of
shortage. For example, if each customer is to get only two-thirds, of
its prior supply, the same formula should be applied to the de facto
monopolist's own customer operations. The gasoline crisis of 1973
illustrates this problem.17 4 It was widely suspected that integrated
major oil companies were using the crisis to foreclose independent
170 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
171 Id. at 435-39.
172 Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, held
[t]hat it was unlawful to set the price of "sheet" so low and hold the price of ingot so
high .. .provided, as we have held, that on this record the price of ingot must be
regarded as higher than a "fair price."
148 F.2d at 438. Alcoa asserted that it "charged" its fabricating divisions the same price as it
charged non-integrated fabrications. The court looked carefully at Alcoa's differing rates of
return in reaching its conclusions. 148 F.2d at 436-37.
173 This was exactly the fact situation at issue in Eastman Kodak v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927), which is the leading case for the proposition that a
monopolist cannot refuse to deal. Eastman Kodak, which had a monopoly of photographic
supplies at the time, bought various local photographic supply stores that competed with the
plaintiff, Southern Photo Materials, and also unsuccessfully sought to acquire the plaintiff.
Eastman Kodak then refused to deal with the plaintiff as a dealer-i.e., at the normal dealers'
discounts. This was held illegal.
174 See, e.g., Brennan Petroleum Prods. Co. v. Pasco Petroleum Co., 373 F. Supp. 1312 (D.
Ariz. 1974), which involved allegations that a small integrated oil company had favored its own
newly-built service stations over independent stations.
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competition.' 7 5 The Federal Energy Administration developed spe-
cial regulations designed to ensure that this did not continue.
1 76
Finally, the de facto monopoly situation can create special tie-in
and reciprocity problems. If the de facto monopolist favors custom-
ers who buy other products from him, he is exploiting a shortage to
benefit his other operations.'7 7 All that is required for a tie-in is that
the seller be selling two products and use his monopoly power over
one product to boost sales of the other by requiring the purchase of
both as a condition of doing business, ' s" thereby foreclosing compet-
ing sellers of the tie product from the market. As the Supreme
Court has said, "tying agreements fare harshly under the laws for-
bidding restraints of trade"179-largely because the Court has found
that they "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of
competition."' 80 As a result, they are illegal per se under both the
Clayton Act"8 1 and the Sherman Act.18 2 But the courts have gone
further and treated a situation involving economic pressure-as
opposed to an absolute contractual requirement-as being an illegal
tie-in between the two products. 183 The courts have also required
progressively less showing of economic power in the tie-in area,'
84
17M This concern was reflected in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15
U.S.C. § 753(b)(1)(D) (Supp. IV, 1974), which specifically required FEA, under its allocation
regulations, "to preserve the competitive viability of independent refiners, small refiners,
nonbranded independent marketers, and branded independent marketers."
176 See 10 C.F.R. § 211 (1975). These regulations on mandatory petroleum allocation
provide a complex system of allocating available supply based on a formula tied to use during
a prior base period. Special systems of priority are established (10 C.F.R. § 211.10 (1976)) as
are rules for purchasers without a base period allocation (10 C.F.R. § 211.10 (d)(1976)).
17 The problem is illustrated by Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1974), which arose under 10 C.F.R. § 210 (1975). The plaintiff, a gas station proprietor, split
his allocation during the fuel shortage between the motoring public at large and his "regular
customers." The latter were those who apparently bought other products from the defendant
or had bought gasoline when it was not scarce. Plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the validity
of the regulation. Reeves' actions were characterized as a discrimination in violation of the
regulation but it could well have been challenged as a tie-in-between short-supply gasoline
and other products.
178 See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
179 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953).
180 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
,8, Id. at 306.
182 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1958).
,83 Therefore, for example, situations where differential royalties are provided in a
license, depending on whether the licensee accepts the tied product have been treated as a
tie-in. See, e.g., Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83 F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936). See
also Advance Bus. Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969).
184 For example, in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969), the Supreme Court treated credit offered at favorable terms to purchasers of a
product as creating a tie-in. I believe this trend has gone too far, with the result that the
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with the result that much less "monopoly power" is required to
establish a tie-in than is needed for Sherman Act section 2 pur-
poses. 18 5 The shortage caused by price regulation would surely meet
the tie-in test, even if it failed to meet the section 2 test.186 In essence,
a supplier in a shortage situation--who has real market power-
could use the tie-in as a device for beating the price regulation
scheme: by tying other products to the regulated one, he would earn
a return from the tied product in excess of the market rate.'
87
Reciprocity practices would raise the same essential issues, and
appear to be illegal if based on agreements. There are very few
decided cases on reciprocity under the Sherman Act,' 8 but in prin-
ciple the courts seem to have been willing to recognize the analogy to
tie-ins, and to view reciprocity as" 'an alien and irrelevant factor'...
intruding into the choice among competing products .... )189 Of
course, the "normal" reciprocity case assumes the opposite of what
we have here: that adequate supply is available and that prices are
above the market level. Hence the allegation in such a case is that the
buyer of such a product will favor the seller who buys other products
Supreme Court may be finding monopoly power when competitive initiative is present. See
Baker, Another Look at Franchise Tie-ins after Texaco and Fortner, 14 ANTITRUST BULL. 767,
773-76 (1969). However, the Supreme Court has just granted certiorari on a later stage of the
Fortner litigation, and may have a chance to reconsider the issue. See United States Steel Corp.
v. Fortner Enterprises, 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1100 (1976).
185 Congress in fact passed a special statutory tie-in rule for banks in 1970, partially as a
result of these kinds of situations. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 12
U.S.C. § 1972 (1970). Banking institutions are subject to credit shortages from time to time as
a result of deposit interest regulation (e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1970) (prohibiting interest on
demand deposits)), and are also subject to usury law ceilings on loans (e.g., N.Y. Banking Law
§ 108 (McKinney 1971)). Congress was concerned about the effects of the monopoly power in
part thus created, and therefore Congress enacted an absolutely flat prohibition on tying
certain other financial services to bank loans.
186 This is contrary to my argument at text accompanying notes 149-63 supra.
187 See 10 C.F.R. § 210.62 (1976) (FEA General Allocation and Price Rule). This regula-
tion mandates delivery during shortage "according to normal business practice" (id.
§ 210.62(a)), and it expressly outlaws "[a]ny practice which constitutes a means to obtain a
price higher than is permitted by the regulations .... Such practices include, but are not
limited to ... commissions, kickbacks, retroactive increases ... premiums, discounts, special
privileges, tie-in agreements ...." (id. § 210.62(c)). See generally Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974).
188 See United States v. Airco, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). General Dynamics involved both a Clayton Act § 7
charge and a separate Sherman Act § 1 charge against the practice itself. Airco involved
exclusively Sherman Act §§ 1-2 charges (which the Government lost on the record).
189 FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965), quoting International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947). Consolidated Foods was exclusively a Clayton
Act § 7 challenge to a merger that would produce reciprocity.
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from the buyer.190 This analysis, however, can be turned around in
the shortage situation created by regulated prices at below the
market-clearing level. Here the reciprocity practice would be that
the seller of the shortage item would simply favor buyers who sold
him other shortage items on terms not otherwise available. Again, as
with tie-ins, such a firm would be beating the price regulation
scheme to its own advantage. 191 Although such a case would obvi-
ously be novel, it seems at least as sound in principle as the more
traditional reciprocity cases brought during the past decade.
All of this suggests that de facto monopoly power created by
price regulation does offer a range of special and interesting anti-
trust problems. Government's key role in creating the monopoly
power makes the antitrust problem no easier. It is of course impor-
tant here that government is commanding that prices be regulated,
not that individual firms take advantage-of the situation and favor
themselves over others through special anticompetitive deals under
the scheme. Price regulations may be fundamentally at odds with the
fundamental antitrust goal of a free market, but antitrust law re-
mains appropriate as a tool for dealing with the market power that
government has unwittingly created.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, governments have not only created cartels and
monopolies but also interesting and novel antitrust problems. The
potential stakes for consumers and businessmen are large. The key
challenge for businessmen and lawyers is to approach these prob-
lems in a careful and fact-oriented way. Antitrust law tends to re-
spond to significant variations in fact situations; and therefore,
careful analysis of effects and alternatives are often more important
than mechanical parsing of old cases. Simplistic assumptions should
be avoided at all cost-especially assumptions that the presence of a
prince or a bureaucrat in the midst of some scheme necessarily
eliminates any antitrust risk.
190 Thus, in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), the Supreme Court
dealt with "[a] threatened withdrawal of orders if products ... cease being bought, as well as a
conditioning of future purchases on the receipt of orders for products . 3..." 380 U.S. at 594.
The Supreme Court held that this is an anticompetitive practice. Such reciprocity "is one of
the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed. The practice
results in 'an irrelevant or alien factor,' . . . intruding into the choice among competing
products, creating at least 'a priority on the business at equal prices.'" Id. The reported
Sherman Act § 1 cases challenging reciprocity also deal with allegations that the buyer has used
his power to secure preferential sales of other products. See cases cited in note 174 supra.
191 See note 187 supra.
1976]
